Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2008

Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral
Beverage Corporation : Amicus Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown.
Donald J. Winder; John W. Holt; Winder & Counsel; Attorneys for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corporation, No. 20081054.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2869

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee

Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC

vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE
CORPORATION
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE HAVAS AND P and F FOOD
SERVICES
AS AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION

DONALD J. WINDER #3519
JOHN W. HOLT #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 W. 200 S., Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Ivers,
Katherine Havas and P and F Food
Services

UTAH AFPELLATi COURTS

SEP 3 - 2010

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee

Supreme Court Case No. 20081054-SC

vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE HAVAS AND P and F FOOD
SERVICES
AS AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION

DONALD J. WINDER #3519
JOHN W. HOLT #5720
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 W. 200 S., Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Ivers,
Katherine Havas and P and F Food
Services

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
STATEMENT OF ISSUE

1
1, 2
2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2,3,4

ARGUMENT

4

CONCLUSION

11

ADDENDUM

13

A.

Ivers Jury Instructions

B.

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine

C.

Excerpts of Phillip Cook Trial Testimony

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007)

1, 5, 6

Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005)

5

State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269,
271 (Utah 1952)
7
UtahDept. ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987)

6

Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984)

12

Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974)

6, 8

Utah State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971)

6,7

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Fifth Amendment

1
UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article 1, § 22

1
STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 78B 6-511

1,4,7

ii

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
•

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "[N]or shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation."
•

Article I, §22, Utah Constitution: "Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation." (Emphasis added).
•

§78B-6-511:
The court, jury or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and assess:
UTAH CODE ANN.

(2)
if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
James Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services (referred to herein
collectively as "Arby's") are the parties to the very case this Court intends to reconsider,
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) (referred to herein
as "Ivers I"). Following the recent trial in the Ivers case, Arby's filed a new appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court.
20100511 -SC.

Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, Case No.

The difficulties in applying Ivers I are what led to the outcome
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necessitating a new appeal in Ivers. Because the Ivers case has now actually been tried
under the law set down in Ivers I Arby's can provide additional insight and analysis
concerning why the Ivers I ruling is problematic with respect to the distinction between
view and visibility in determining severance damages. The Court's decision in the
present matter is of great interest to Arby's and will have a direct impact on its pending
appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and
Rehearing in this matter, it appears the issue to be considered is whether the distinction in
Ivers I between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a property owner's right to
recover severance damages.
SUMMARY OF ARBY'S ARGUMENT
Arby's is filing this Amicus Brief in support of Admiral Beverage Corporation's
position that the distinction between view and visibility unconstitutionally limits a
property owner's right to recover just compensation.

Arby's does not dispute the

appropriateness of the causation analysis of Ivers I which adopts the "essential" test. The
causation analysis does not need to be reconsidered.
After its long history in the appellate court system, the Ivers case wasfinallytried
in Second District Court on April 13-15, 2010. Pursuant to this Court's mandate, the sole
issue to be tried was the amount of severance damages relating to Arby's loss of view.
The difficulties encountered in applying Ivers I at trial highlights the constitutional

2

problems with the ruling. The parties and the district court attempted to instruct the jury
based upon their often inconsistent interpretations of Ivers I.

The process was

challenging, particularly when attempting to reconcile other well-settled principles of
condemnation law.
Additionally, over objection, UDOT's appraiser was permitted to base his
professional opinion that Arby's had sustained no damage. This opinion is based in part
on irrelevant and unsupported interviews of lay witnesses, such as managers of unrelated
fast food restaurants. UDOT's appraiser was also permitted to testify that there is a
distinction between properties where loss of view is compensable and where it is not
compensable. In other words, he suggested to the jury that there are property types where
an owner, such as Arby's, is not entitled to the constitutionally protected right of just
compensation for damage caused to remnant property by an obstruction of view.
According to this appraiser, compensation for loss of view would be reserved for things
like high end resort properties with mountain views.
Although this Court's mandate was for the trial court to determine Arby's
damages, the jury ultimately awarded no severance damages to Arby's. The jury verdict
was inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Arby's view had been damaged by UDOT's
construction project. Arby's was denied just compensation under the application of Ivers
I.
Just compensation in a case involving a claim for severance damages is, and
should be, based upon the diminution in fair market value of the remnant property. The
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distinction in Ivers I between view and visibility is confusing, overly complex, and
restricts the jury's consideration of factors required to fairly and fully value property and
award appropriate severance damages. Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court's distinction
between view and visibility should be overturned as an unconstitutional limitation on a
property owner's right to recover severance damages.
ARGUMENT
Private property rights are protected by both the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. Both of these
documents, which set the very foundations for state and federal law, prohibit the taking of
property without just compensation. As thoroughly outlined in Admiral Beverage's
Supplemental Brief, Utah's Constitution provides even broader protection than the United
States Constitution by including language that property will not be damaged for public
use without just compensation.
Utah's condemnation statutes, which must be interpreted and applied consistent
with the constitutional mandates, provide as follows with respect to severance damages:
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence
offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
determine and assess:

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only
a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
the [condemning authority]. (Emphasis added).
4

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511.

Originally, Arby's claim for severance damages included claims that the value of
its remnant property was damaged by UDOT's taking of a portion of Arby's property
used to eliminate the traditional intersection at Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington,
Utah. Arby's property is located on the northwest corner of the former intersection at
Shepard Lane and U.S. 89. Not only was direct access to Arby's remnant property
eliminated, but, as this Court pointed out in Ivers /, the property's view and visibility
were blocked by UDOT's elevation of U.S. 89 immediately east of Arby's remnant
property. Ivers I, 154 P.3d at 804. Arby's journey through the appellate courts began
when the trial court granted UDOT's motion in limine, precluding Arby's from presenting
any evidence of severance damages to a jury. Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals determined that because the portion of UDOT's
construction project that interfered with Arby's property rights was not itself constructed
on property taken from Arby's, causation for severance damages was not established.
Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005).
Following the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but only on the issue of whether loss of view and visibility are factors in
awarding severance damages. In short, this Court was called upon to address the Court of
Appeals' causation analysis and to determine whether loss of view and visibility are
appropriately considered in connection with awarding severance damages.
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With respect to causation, this Court properly rejected UDOTs assertion that in
order to recover severance damages, the view-impairing structure must be built directly
upon the severed land. Ivers /, 154 P.2d at 807. This Court held:
When land is condemned as part of a single project - even if
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other
than that which was condemned - if the use of the condemned
property is essential to the completion of the project as a
whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages.
Id
However, this Court went on to distinguish between view and visibility, and held
there is no protected property right in visibility. Id. At 805-06. Therefore, Arby's was
precluded from presenting evidence of claimed damage related to loss of visibility. Id.
Not only will the Ivers I ruling impact other property owners seeking just
compensation, such as Admiral Beverage, but the Ivers case itself has now been in the
crucible of the trial court and the effect of the Supreme Court's holding can be evaluated
under the light of actual experience.
At trial, the parties and the district court attempted to prepare jury instructions that
were consistent with Ivers I. However, the task was made difficult because of differing
interpretations of the Ivers I ruling and because of other well-settled precedent that
conflict with aspects of Ivers I. For example, other important condemnation cases that
remain good law in Utah include Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926
(Utah 1974); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987); Utah
State Road Commission v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971); and others.
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Additionally, well-settled law concerning how damages are calculated in
condemnation cases remains intact following Ivers L These principles became confused
in an attempt to follow Ivers L Compensation for severance damages is the difference in
the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after the taking. See,
e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saintsy 247
P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952). This determination of fair market value can only be made by
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value. As this
Court stated in Rohan,
In making the appraisal, it is not only permissible but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a
prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the
facts, would take into account in arriving at its market value.
487 P.2d at 859.
As the actual trial proceedings in the Ivers case reveal, the long-standing principle
set forth in Rohan must be ignored in order to apply the Ivers I holding that loss of view
is considered, but loss of visibility is not.
The jury instructions in the Ivers trial were essentially qualified to reflect this
Court's restriction that only loss of view could be considered. Moreover, based upon
Ivers I it was not clear whether a jury was tasked with providing a value for a specific
property right that was damaged, i.e. view1, or whether view was a factor to consider
under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511 for calculating severance damages, i.e., the

Attempts to isolate and appraise separate items of damages were rejected by this Court
inito/z^.487P.2dat859.
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reduction in fair market value of the remnant property. For example, Jury Instruction No.
31 informed the jury "The issues in this case include the value of the loss of view from
[Arby's] property," indicating view was to be isolated and valued. (A copy of the Ivers
Jury Instructions are attached hereto as Addendum "A").

Jury Instruction No. 33,

contained the following caveat based upon Ivers I: "A property owner adjoining a public
highway has no right to be viewed by passing traffic and is not entitled to any
compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing traffic." (Emphasis
added). In other words, despite being a factor sellers and buyers of real property would
consider, the jury was not permitted to consider loss of visibility in determining Arby's
damages.
With respect to loss of view, Jury Instruction No. 34 provided "The loss of view is
to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway
structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the property." This instruction was
offered by Arby's in an attempt to reflect Miya. In Miya, this Court held the obstruction
in that case was to be considered in determining severance damages.

Specifically,

severance damages were to be measured "by the effect the obstruction of view, created by
the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property." 526 P.2d
at 929.

However, the definition of market value was confusingly limited in Jury

Instruction No. 36 as follows: "In this case you are to determine the fair market value of
the loss of view from the defendants' property." (Emphasis added). Again, using Ivers I
as guidance, jurors were told "just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss
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of view from defendant's property." Addendum "A" at Jury Instruction No. 39. Under
this instruction, jurors were required to isolate loss of view and place upon it a monetary
value.
With respect to computing damages generally, the jurors were told they had to
"decide the value of the loss of view from the Defendants' property by determining the
fair market value as of December 30, 2002. Id. at Jury Instruction No. 40. In short, not
only were the Jury Instructions confusing, but jurors were given the impossible task of
attempting to evaluate fair market value without considering all of the conditions caused
by the elevated structure that buyers and sellers of real estate would take into account in
valuing real property. The jury instructions were drafted pursuant to the parties' best
efforts to comply with Ivers I.
The problems with the Jury Instructions were exacerbated by the testimony
UDOT's appraiser, Phillip Cook, was permitted to give at trial. Cook's opinion was that
despite the view obstruction, there was absolutely no monetary impact. Prior to trial,
Arby's attempted to restrict Cook's testimony through a motion in limine. (A copy of the
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "B").
However, the district court denied the motion in limine and permitted Cook to testify that
in his professional opinion, based in part upon testimony of lay witnesses, Arby's had
sustained no damages as a result of UDOT's view-obstructing project. Cook's opinion
was based upon such things as interviews with managers of unrelated fast-food
restaurants who opined that view had no impact on their businesses. See, generally,
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Addendum "B". At trial, Cook also advocated that a distinction can legitimately be made
between categories of properties where damage to view is compensable and where it is
not compensable. In connection with telling the jury that the loss of view had no impact
on the value of Arby's remnant property, Cook took the position that view only has value
for certain types of properties, such as resort hotels looking over the ocean, high end
residential properties, office spaces with views of the Wasatch Mountains, and hotel
rooms with views of the San Francisco Bay or the Golden Gate Bridge. (A copy of
portions of Cook's trial testimony is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). In other words,
according to UDOT and its appraiser, under Ivers I the constitutional rights are
selectively applied. Just compensation is not afforded to everyone who has property
damaged by a condemneds actions. UDOT was able to use the Ivers I decision to
continue to deny just compensation to Arby's. Under Ivers /, Arby's property right was
narrowly defined and marginalized, allowing the jury to buy in to UDOT's claim there
was no damage.
The type of segregation attempted at the Ivers trial is not appropriate. It prevents
just compensation from being awarded to property owners because certain factors
impacting value are disregarded and it opens the door to the type of testimony given by
Phillip Cook that a property owner need not be compensated for loss of view, even when
the causation element is satisfied. In Ivers, Arby's was awarded no severance damages
for loss of view although it was undisputed the property's view has been obstructed. Zero
damages does not qualify as just compensation for damaged property.
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Arby's agrees with Admiral Beverage and submits the ruling in Ivers I is
unconstitutional inasmuch as it interferes with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation, as revealed by the results of the Ivers trial itself Attempting to isolate the
issue of loss of view prevents a property owner from being made whole based upon a fair
comparison of property value before and after the taking.

See Utah State Road

Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) ("just compensation means the
owners must be put in as good as position money wise as they would have occupied had
their property not been taken"). The distinction between loss of view and visibility
resulted in a denial of Arby's constitutional rights. That result will be perpetuated in
other cases if the decision is allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Arby's, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests this
Court overturn the portion of the Ivers I ruling that distinguishes between view and
visibility as factors to be evaluated in determining severance damages.
Respectfully submitted this Q

day of September, 2010.
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

INALD J. WINDER
W. HOLT
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ADDENDUM
A

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 020700665

JAMES IVERS; KATHERTNE G. HAVAS;
and P AND F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant),

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendants.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one (1) through
twenty-one (21), given to you at the beginning of the trial You will receive additional
instructions at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your
conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be carefully followed.

1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Before the trial of this case begins, I need to give you some instructions to help you
understand what you will see and hear.
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff is the
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. The party who is being sued is called the
defendant. In this case the defendants are JAMES IVERS, KATHERINE G. HA VAS, and P
AND F FOOD SERVICES.
The defendants seek damages for diminution of fair market value for loss of view
resulting from the condemnation of their property and the construction of an elevated
public highway.
The plaintiff has already compensated the defendants for all other damages related to the
condemnation of the defendants' property.
2.

GENERAL ADMONITIONS

You have now been sworn as jurors in this case. I want to impress on you the seriousness
of being a juror. You must come to the case without bias and attempt to reach a fair verdict based
on the evidence and on the law. Before we begin, I need to explain how to conduct yourselves
during the trial.
Do not allow anything that happens outside this courtroom to affect your decision. During
the trial do not talk about this case with anyone, including your family, friends, or even your
fellow jurors until after I tell you that it is time for you to decide the case. When it is time to
decide the case, you will meet in the jury room. You may discuss the case only in the jury room,
at the end of the trial, when all of the jurors are present. After the trial is over and I have released
you from the jury, you may discuss the case with anyone, but you are not required to do so.
During the trial do not read about the case in the newspapers or on the internet or listen to
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. If a headline or an announcement catches your
attention, do not read or listen further. Media accounts may be inaccurate or may contain matters
that are not evidence.
You must decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this trial and the
instructions that I provide. Do not investigate the case or conduct any experiments. Do not do any
research on your own or as a group. Do not use dictionaries, the internet, or other reference
materials. Do not contact anyone to assist you. Do not visit or view the scene of the events in this
case. If you happen to pass by the scene do not stop or investigate.
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Evidence can only be presented one piece at a
time. Do not form or express an opinion about the case while the trial is going on. You must not

decide on a verdict until after you have heard all of the evidence and have discussed it thoroughly
with your fellow jurors in your deliberations.
Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your verdict.
At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict.
You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law.
3.

FURTHER ADMONITION ABOUT ELECTRONIC DEVICES

Serious problems have been caused around the country by jurors using computer and
electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigate a case, or to share
with others our thoughts about the trial, and it's easy to do so with the internet and instant
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on.
However, please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed over
hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire
system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on evidence presented
to you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if you
conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others.
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling" the
parties, issues, or counsel; "Twittering" with friends about the trial; using Blackberries or
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a mistrial.
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried,
at substantial cost.
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror.
So I must warn you again - do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do no interest research
of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so.

4.

ROLE OF THE JUDGE, JURY AND LAWYERS
You and I and the lawyers are all officers of the court, and we play important roles in the

trial.
It's my role to supervise the trial and to decide all legal questions, such as deciding
objections to evidence and deciding the meaning of the law. I will also instruct you on the law
that you must apply.

It's your role to follow that law and to decide what the facts are. The facts generally relate
to who, what, when, why, and how or how much. The facts must be supported by evidence.
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role. You should decide the case
based upon the evidence presented in court and the instructions that I give you.
It's the lawyers' role to present evidence, generally by calling and questioning witnesses
and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to decide the case in favor of
his or her client.
Things that you see on television and in the movies may not accurately reflect the way
real trials should be conducted. Real trials should be conducted with professionalism, courtesy
and civility.
5.

ORDER OF TRIAL
The trial will generally proceed as follows:

(1) Opening statements. The lawyers will make opening statements, outlining what the
case is about and what they think the evidence will show.
(2) Presentation of evidence. The defendants will offer evidence first, followed by the
plaintiff. The parties may later offer more evidence, called rebuttal evidence, after hearing the
witnesses and seeing the exhibits.
(3) Instructions on the law. Throughout the trial and after the evidence has been fully
presented, I will instruct you on the law that you must apply. You must obey these instructions.
You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law.
(4) Closing arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will
share with you their views of the evidence, how is relates to the law and how they think you
should decide the case.
(5) Jury deliberations. The final step is for you to go to the jury room and discuss the case
among yourselves until you reach a verdict. Your verdict must be based on the evidence
presented in court and on my instructions on the law. I will give you more instructions about that
step at a later time.
6.

SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS NOT SIGNIFICANT

From time to time throughout the trial, I will instruct you on the law. The order in which I
give the instructions has no significance. You must consider the instructions in their entirety,
giving them all equal weight. I do not intend to emphasize any particular instruction, and neither
should you.

7.

JURORS MUST FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS

The instructions that I give you are the law, and your oath requires you to. follow my
instructions even if you disagree with them.
8.

JURORS MAY NOT DECIDE BASED ON SYMPATHY, PASSION, AND
PREJUDICE

You must not decide this case for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or
angry at anyone. You must decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to
sympathy, passion or prejudice.9. •• . NOTIi:-TAKING
If you wish, you may take notes during the trial and have those notes with you when you
discuss the case. We will provide you with writing materials if you need them. If you. take notes,
do not over do it, and do not let your note-taking distract you from following the evidence, and
you should use them only as a tool to aid your personal memory when it comes time to decide the
case.
1.0.

RULES APPLICABLE TO RECESSES

From time to time, I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break,
overnight or longer. You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. You
must obey the following instructions during the recesses:
Do not talk about this case with anyone - not family, friends or even each other. While
you are in the courthouse, the clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so
that people will not try to discuss the case with you.
If anyone tries to discuss the case in your presence, despite your telling them not to, tell
the clerk or the bailiff that you need to see me. If you must talk to me, do not discuss it with your
fellow jurors.
Although it is normal human tendency to talk with other people, do not talk or otherwise
communicate with any of the parties or their lawyers or with any witness. By this, I mean do not
talk with them at all, even to pass the time of day.
Finally, do not make up your mind about what the verdict should be until after you have
gone to the jury room to decide the case, and you and your fellow jurors have discussed the
evidence. Keep an open mind until then.

11.

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof or that a party must prove something
by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade you, by the evidence
presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true.
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, but
I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case, hi a civil case such as this one, a
different level of proof applies; proof by a preponderance of evidence.
Another way of saying this is proof by the greater weight of the evidence, however slight.
Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the amount of
testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In weighing the
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party
presented it. The weight given to each piece of evidence is for you do decide.
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than not,
then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, if you decide that the
evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact.
At the close of the trial, I will instruct you in more detail about the specific elements that
must be proved.
12.

EVIDENCE

"Evidence" is anything that tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact. It can be the
testimony of a witness or documents or objects or photographs or stipulations or certain qualified
opinions or any combination of these things.
You must entirely disregard any evidence for which I sustain an objection and any
evidence that I order to be struck.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and you must
entirely disregard it. Do not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make any
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view locations involved in the case, or
inspect any things or articles not produced in court. Do not look things up on the internet. Do not
look for information in books, dictionaries or public or private records that are not produced in
court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you.
Do not consider anything that you may have heard or read about this case in the media or
byword of mouth or other out-of-court communication.
The lawyers might stipulate to a fact or I might take judicial notice of a fact. Otherwise,
what I say and what the lawyers say usually are not evidence.

You are to consider only the evidence in the case, but you are not expected to abandon
your common sense. You are permitted to interpret the evidence in light of your experience.
13.

DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence
consists of facts or circumstances that allow someone to reasonably infer the truth of the facts to
be proved. For example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a
witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the
fact. If the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with Cherries smeared on his face and an empty
pie plate in his hand, that is circumstantial evidence of the fact.
14.

BELIEVABILITY OF WITNESSES

Testimony in this case will be given under oath. You must evaluate the believability of
that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the testimony of a witness. You may also
believe one witness against many witnesses or many against one, in accordance with your honest
convictions. In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider the following:
(1) Personal interest. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected one way
or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the case?
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by any bias or
prejudice?
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about the witness's appearance, conduct or actions that
causes you to give more or less weight to the testimony?
(4) Consistency. How does that testimony tend to support or not support other believable
evidence that is offered in the case?
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what he or she is
testifying about?
(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable?
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light of human
experience?
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate testimony. You are the
ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability.

15.

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement inconsistent with
that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean that you are required to disregard the
testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness.

16.

EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY

If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any important matter,
you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or you may disregard only intentionally
false testimony.
17.

STIPULATIONS

A stipulation is an agreement. Unless I instruct you otherwise, when the lawyers on both
sides stipulate or agree to a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact
as proved. The parties have stipulated to the following facts:
a)

The legal description of the property subject to this litigation;

b)

That the photograph of the subject property introduced into evidence by the
defendants is an accurate representation of the subject property; and

c)

That the date of valuation is December 30,2002.

Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you must accept them as true for purposes of
this case.
18.

OBJECTIONS AND RULINGS ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE

From time to time during the trial, I may have to make rulings on objections or motions
made by the lawyers. Lawyers on each side of a case have a right to object when the other side
offers evidence that the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not think less of a lawyer
or a party because the lawyer makes objections. You should not conclude from any ruling or
comment that I make that I have any opinion about the merits of the case or that I favor one side
or the other. And if I sustain an objection to a question, you should not draw any conclusions
from the question itself.
During the trial I may have to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing about questions
of law or procedure. Sometimes you may be excused from the courtroom for that same reason. I
will try to limit these interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance
of the matter you are here to decide. Please be patient even though the case may seem to go
slowly.

19.

STATEMENT OF OPINION

Under limited circumstances, I will allow a witness to express an opinion. You do not
have to believe an opinion, whether or not it comes from an expert witness. Consider opinion
testimony as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves.
20.

EXPERT WITNESS

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling,
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it
deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may
disregard the opinion entirely.
21.

CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF EXPERTS

In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of J. Philip Cook and Jack Brown
and Gary Free, you may compare and weight the opinion of one against that of another. In doing
this, you may consider the qualifications and credibility of each, as well as the reasons of each
opinion and the facts on which the opinions are based.
[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL]]
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED]

22.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE

The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages, which
contain instructions relating to the procedure that you should follow and the particular laws or
rales that apply in this case. These additional instructions begin with instruction number twentytwo (22). We will now read those instructions.
23.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM

You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss
this case:

24.

a.

All exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

Your notes (if any);

c.

Your copy of these instructions; and

d.

The verdict form or forms.

NOTES

The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your memory is perfectly acceptable. But let
me caution you not to rely excessively upon your notes. You must arrive at a verdict
independently, after consultation with the other jurors; and each of you must rely on your own
memory of the evidence. One juror's opinion should not be given excessive consideration solely
because that juror has taken notes.
25.

SELECTION OF JURY FOREPERSON AND DELIBERATION

When you go into the jury room, your first task is to select a foreperson. The foreperson
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed. The
foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be given the
same weight as the opinions of the other jurors.
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another - or deliberate - with a
view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during discussions are very important.
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made up.
Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that your mind cannot be
changed. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after discussing the case with
your fellow jurors.

Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, you.
should not surrender your honest convictions just to end the deliberations or to agree with other
jurors.
• 26. •, • : WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS. .DURING JIK1,1 UK K A' 1JI )N
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate.
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based
upon the evidence.
27.

FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE

Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or
collective views about anything other than the issues you are called upon to decide. Your, verdict
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a
just and proper verdict.
>S,

IX > NOT SPECULATE ORRESORT TO CHANCE

When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's opinions at
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence.
If you decide that a party is entitled to recover damages, you must then agree upon the
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent judgment
on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, evaluate
them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an agreement on the amount.
You must not agree in advance to average the estimates.
29.

AGREEMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

I am going to give you a form called the Special Verdict that contains a single question.
You must answer the question based upon the evidence you have seen and heard during this trial.
Because this is not a criminal case, your verdict does not have to be unanimous. At least
six jurors must agree on the answer to the question.
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to the question, the foreperson should
sign and date the verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The bailiff will escort you
back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Special Verdict with you.

30.

W H A T HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED

After you have given your verdict to the court, I, or the clerk, may ask each of you about
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom if you wish to watch the rest of the proceedings,
which should be quite brief.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to
do that, please tell the court clerk or bailiff.
31.

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

This is a condemnation proceeding, commenced under the laws of the State of Utah for
the purpose of condemning and acquiring private property of the defendant landowners for a
public purpose. The party commencing this action, known as the plaintiff, is the Utah
Department of Transportation, and the property owners, known as the defendants, are James
Ivers, Katherine Havas, and P and F Food Services. The issues in this case include the value of
the loss of view from the defendants' property.
32.

OWNER TESTIFYING

The defendants have rendered an opinion as to the value of loss of view from their
property. In considering the weight to be given to the defendants' testimony on the value of the
loss of view from their property, you may consider the defendants' bias and personal
involvement, the defendants' specific knowledge of the property, and the defendants' experience
and qualifications to testify regarding land value.
33.

TAKING

In this case, the condemnation or "taking" involves a parcel of land which was
condemned as an essential component for the plaintiffs project to expand and elevate U.S.
Highway 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah.
A property owner has a reasonable right of access to an adjacent public highway, and a
reasonable right to receive air and light from an adjacent public highway and a view from their
property.
If you find that the fair market value of the remaining property is less in the "after
condition" than the "before condition" because of a loss of view, then you may award damages
based on the reduced value of the remaining property. This damage must be reasonably certain
and not contingent, remote or speculative.

A property owner adjoining a public highway has no right to be seen by passing traffic
and is not entitled to any compensation because of loss of visibility by or exposure to passing
traffic.
34.

LOSS OF VIEW

In this case, it has already been determined that the defendants have a legal right to
recover damages, if proved, for the loss of view. The loss of view is to be measured by the effect
the obstruction of the view, created by the elevated highway structure, has upon the market^^re
oftneTesidue of the property.
^^^mm—
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35.

DAMAGES TO REAL PROPERTY PERMANENT INJURY

The measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in the fair market
value of the land immediately before and after the injury. This is called "diminution in value."
36.

FAIR MARKET VALUE

Fair market value is the highest probable price estimated in terms of money that land
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with a reasonable time allowed in which to
find a buyer with knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which the land was adapted.
In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer would have paid a
willing seller in an amis-length transaction with both parties being fully informed concerning all
of the advantages and disadvantages to the property, and with neither acting under any
compulsion to buy or sell.
In this case you are to determine the fair market value of the loss of view from the
defendants' property.
37.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The defendants have the burden of proving the amount of damages for diminution in
value of the subject property.
38.

COMPARABLE SALES

Some of the witnesses have testified about sales of property similar to the property
involved in this case. You may consider the price voluntarily paid for similar property under
similar circumstances in helping you determine the value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property in this case. Comparable sales are factors to be considered but are not the sole basis in
determining fair market value of the property in dispute.

39.

JUST COMPENSATION

The plaintiff has the right to condemn and take the defendants' property because of public
necessity. In this case, just compensation must be paid for the value of the loss of view from the
defendants' property. Just compensation includes the fair market value of the loss of view from
the defendants' property.
40.

COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES

In arriving at your verdict, you shall fix the just compensation to be paid to the defendants
in the following manner: You will decide the value of the loss of view from the defendants'
property by determining the fair market value as of December 30, 2002.
41.

INTEREST

You are not to consider interest in assessing the value of the defendants' property, nor add
it to the compensation you award. I will compute and add such interest to the compensation
assessed by you. You are not to consider any costs of these proceedings since any such costs will
be dealt with by me in accordance with the law.
42.

LOSS OF PROFITS

In arriving at your determination of fair market value of the subject property, you shall
not consider alleged injury to any business or business operation conducted on or about the
dependants' property as of the date of condemnation as a separate element of recoverable
damages. Nor should you consider any claim for loss of profit or income from any business
operation caused by the condemnation of the land and improvements for the public use as a
separate element of recoverable damages. The plaintiff in this action must pay to the defendant
the fair market value of the property being acquired, which has occurred but for the defendants'
loss of view from the property. Such factors as claimed damage to business operations or loss of
profits are not recoverable, but may be considered as bearing upon establishing the market value
of the subject property.
43.

HIGHEST AND BEST USE

The defendants are entitled to just compensation based upon the highest and best use for
which the property was reasonably adapted on the date of taking, without limitation to the use
that was actually made of the property. The highest and best use means its most advantageous
and valuable use, having due regard to the existing conditions and reasonable needs or wants of
the community, including such needs or wants as may probably be expected in the reasonably
foreseeable future. The term "probably" means that the property would more likely than not be
put to a particular use except for the taking.
An owner may show present or future uses which are sufficiently practicable and
probable as to likely influence the price which an informed purchaser would have given for the

property at the time of the taking. The uses which may be considered must be so reasonably
probable as to have an effect on the fair market value of the land at the time of taking. A purely
imaginative or speculative use cannot be considered.
In deteimining highest and best use, you may take into consideration: (1) the actual use of
the property at the date fixed for evaluation; (2) its location; (3) its topography; (4) the use of the
surrounding properties, both past and present; (5) the zoning of the property at the time in
question, or the lack thereof; (6) the availability of water and utility facilities as of that time; (7)
market conditions in the general vicinity; (8) the supply and demand for comparable property in
the general area; and (9) any other factors which you believe the informed and willing buyer and
seller would take into account in fixing the probable use of the subject property as of December
30, 2002, or within the reasonably foreseeable future.
44

ACCESS

You are instructed that the use of the highways and streets may be limited, controlled and
regulated by the exercise of the police power to the extent necessaiy to promote the health, safety
and welfare of the public. However, the right to enter and leave a person's land cannot be entirely
cut off. Free and convenient access shall be provided to an owner who had free and convenient
access prior to the enactment of the regulation.
45.

SPECULATIVE COMPENSATION

In determining just compensation, you are not to take into consideration imaginative or
speculative values or damages. You are not to consider the price for which the property would
sell under special or extraordinary circumstances, but only such values that are real and supported
by the evidence.
46.

VIEWING OF PROPERTY

You may use any information or knowledge obtained by you while viewing the property
in this case only for the purpose of determining the weight and applicability of the testimony and
evidence introduced in this trial.
Your view of the property is not evidence, in and of itself, upon which a verdict may be
based. You may use it only to aid you in better understanding the testimony of the witnesses.
47.

SYMPATHY OR ANIMOSITY NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

The plaintiff has a legal right to condemn land under appropriate circumstances for the
purpose of constructing public projects. You shall not assess compensation in favor of the
defendant solely because the land may have been taken against the defendants' will. Rather, your
verdict shall be limited to the fair market value of the loss of view from the defendants5 property.

48.

SETTLEMENT OF VALUE OF PROPERTY

The parties have already reached agreement on the fair market value of the property taken
for the highway construction. The landowner has already been fully paid this value.
The purpose of this trial is to determine if the landowner is to receive any additional
compensation for the value of the loss of view from their property. You are to determine that
dollar value, if any.
49.

ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL NOT EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES

You may consider the arguments of the attorneys to assist you in deciding the amounts of
damages, but their arguments are not evidence.

ADDENDUM
B

Donald J. Winder #3519
John W. Holt #5720
WMDER & COUNSEL, P.C.
175 West 200 South #4000
P. O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF J.
PHILLIP COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020700665
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS,
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant)
Defendants.

Judge Michael Allphin
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Defendants (collectively referred to herein as "Arby's"), by and through counsel, hereby
respectfully submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion
to Strike Portions of J, Phillip Cook's Appraisal.
INTRODUCTION
Arby's has sustained severance damages as a result of Plaintiffs ("UDOT") construction
project to elevate U.S, 89 over Shepard Lane in Farmington, Utah, After a lengthy appeals
process, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled Axby's is entitled present evidence to a jury to

support the severance damages claim. UDOT has attempted through various motions to preclude
Arby's from recovering damages and has now produced an appraisal from J. Phillip Cook (the
"Cook Appraisal"), where Cook opines Defendants have suffered absolutely no damages
resulting from loss of view. Cook's opinion is based upon irrelevant hearsay and opinions from
lay witnesses not qualified as experts. Additionally, Cook has failed to show the information he
obtained from lay witnesses is of the type reasonably relied upon by real estate appraisers to
form their conclusions- Further, the facts and data upon which Cook relies for his opinions have
not been disclosed to Arby's. Relevant portions of the Cook Appraisal, entitled "Market
Participant Interviews," pp. 51-55, are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Cook should not be
pennitted to testify at trial concerning opinions based upon hearsay and lay opinions. He should
also be excluded from testifying based upon irrelevant data.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
COOK RELIES UPON INADMISSABLE HEARSAY
Cook's Appraisal concludes Arby's loss of view has not negatively impacted the value of
the subject real property. This opinion is based upon opinions from lay witnesses Cook or his
assistants allegedly interviewed. Exhibit "A." This is problematic for numerous reasons. First,
the product of these interviews clearly meets the definition of hearsay: out of court statements
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), UTAH R. EVID. Hearsay is generally

2

inadmissible. See Rule 802, UTAH R. EVID, Cook's interviews of lay witnesses do not meet any
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, UTAHR.

EVID.1

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized, in a case where an expert witness based his
opinion in part on out of court statements, "[t]he interjection of such hearsay testimony, cloaked
in the form of an expert opinion, would have been impermissible and potentially highly
prejudicial." Edwards v. Didericlcsen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah 1979). This hearsay evidence
is clearly not admissible at trial.
POINT 2
LAY WITNESSES ARE NOT QUALIFIED AS EXPERTS
While some of Cook's interviewees are named, many of them are not identified and are
only referenced vaguely and generally For example, on page 51, Cook says he spoke with cthe
managers of several fast-food restaurants,..." Exhibit "A". On page 52, he states: "We also
interviewed the site selection managers for various fast-food chains concerning site selection
criteria and view out." Id. Cook identifies an alleged Wendy's representative, Russ Smith, but
does not identify any of the other "managers for various fast-food chains" with whom he
allegedly spoke.
Moreover, insufficient information, is provided concerning the background and
qualifications to give opinions about the impact of loss of view on the fair market value of the

1

The interview material is hearsay upon hearsay to the extent Cook relied upon other parties to
conduct the interviews of lay witnesses and then incorporated that material into his Appraisal. It
is also double hearsay to the extent interviewees merely passed along statements they allegedly
heard from others.
3

subject real property. What are their job duties and backgrounds? Is the valuation of loss of
view any part of their jo b duties? These individuals are apparently involved in. managing
restaurants, but they are not real estate experts. For example, alleged statements of an individual
named Treesa Kurtzenbom about the subject property is used to support Cook's opinion that
Arby's suffered no damage. No information is given concerning Ms. Kurtzenbom's expertise or
familiarity with the subject property, yet she freely speculates and opines that other factors
impacted the value of the subject property more than the view obstruction. There is no
foundation for such a speculative opinion from a lay witness and no explanation for why Cook
would incorporate such a statement from a lay witness into his own expert analysis. This Court
must insure that an expert witness is truly testifying as an expert and not merely serving as a
conduit through which inadmissible hearsay is presented to the jury. United States v. Cormier,
468 F.3d 63, 73 (1 st Cir, 2006) ("an expert witness may not simply summarize the out-of-court
statements of others as his testimony") (citation omitted).
It is clear the lay witnesses Cook interviewed were asked to render opinions based upon
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. Rule 702, UTAH R, EVE), reserves such testimony
to experts who have the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education." Id,
None of Cook's interviewees has been designated a witness in this matter, expert or otherwise.
Lay witness opinions are limited, pursuant to Rule 701, UTAH R,

EVID.,

to the witness's own

perception, rather than scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. The alleged opinions of
Cook's interviewees goes well beyond permitted opinion testimony by lay witnesses.

4

Defendants have not been able to conduct discovery or cross-examine the individuals
Cook interviewed in order to test their evidence. Defendants should be given the opportunity to
draw out anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the lay witness
opinions. It would be blatantly prejudicial to simply permit Cook to pass this untested and
unchallenged infoimation on to the jury.
POINT 3
THE LAY OPINIONS UPON WHICH COOK RELIES ARE IRRELEVANT
There are serious problems with the relevance of Cook's interview data. As an example,
Cook apparently interviewed an assistant store manager of the Smith's store and representatives
of a Burger King on the east side of U.S. 89, across from the subject Arby's location. These
locations are more distant from the elevated U.S. 89 than the Arby's property. The Smith's.store
is further north than the Arby's property and does not face the highest point of the elevated U.S.
89. Additionally, Cook fails to explain how the lack of customer complaints2 about loss of view
at a grocery store (or other unrelated locations) has any bearing on determining the loss in the
fair market value of the subject property. The Cook Appraisal is replete with this land of
irrelevant material.

2

Cook relies upon the purported lack of customer complaints about view at locations other than
subject location as a basis for his opinion that Arby's has suffered no damage for loss of view.
Even if the lack of customer complaints at unrelated business had any relevance in this matter,
Cook has laid no foundation to show that the persons interviewed would have been the persons
to whom customers would have complained.
5

POINT 4
TriE MATERIAL COOK RELIES UPON IS NOT OF THE TYPE AN APPRAISER
REASONABLY BASES OPINIONS
Rule 703, UTAH R. EVJD. states the data upon which an expert bases his opinion need not
be admissible i n evidence if the data is "of a type reasoriiibly relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions...." Cook fails to explain that opinions of lay witnesses,
particularly those who have no familiarity with the subject propei ty; are the type of facts 01 da ta
upon which a licensed real estate appraiser would reasonably rely to value property. The
material, whicli in no! ndinisaible doe to the pioblenis discussed above, is tun of [he type upon
which an appraiser relies to appraise real property. Cook's opinions should be based upon the
standard of R ule ' 702,

UTAH

R. EVID.3 rather .than memorialize .impermissible lay opinions.

Therefore, it should be rejected,, and to the extent Cook has relied upon that information, he
should be excludedfromdiscussing it at trial.
POINTS

Not only does Cook fail to provide any foundation concerning the qualifications of the
interviewees to render opinions, b tit he pro vi des no information about the methodology of the
interview process: How were interviewees selected and qualified? How were the interviews
conducted? How do the interviewees' properties compare to the subject propei ty with respect to
the view issue? "What questions were asked? What is the identity of persons interviewed who
are not discussed in th e Cook Appraisal?

vV hat indi vidual's were interviewed who are not

6

mentioned in the report? What information was obtained through the interview process that
contradicts Cook's opinions? What documentation or recordings exist of the interviews?
Defendants have legitimate concerns about the selective nature of what is referenced in
the Cook Appraisal and the identities, competency and qualifications of those who were
interviewed. At a minimum, pursuant to Rule 705, UTAH R. EVE)., if for some reason the Court
permits Cook to rely upon this data, all of the facts and data underlying Cook's opinions should
be disclosed to Arby's prior to trial.
POINT 6
THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS FUNCTION AS GATEKEEPER
With the concerns referenced above, Cook's opinion does not meet the standards required
under Rule 702. That Rule, in relevant part, provides:
(b) Scientific, technical or otherwise specialized knowledge may
serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or
other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a
threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data, and (Hi) have been reliably applied to the
facts of the case,
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is
satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.
As noted in the Rule's Advisory Committee Note ("Note"), Rule 702, UTAH R EviD. is
to be applied to "all expert testimony." The Note continues by explaining that, just as in federal
court, this rule "assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper5 responsibility to screen out unreliable

7

expert testimony." To fulfill this role, the Note advises that the trial judge should "confront
proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism" and should be "receptive to any plausible
evidence that may bear on reliability."
Because Cook relies upon irrelevant hearsay opinions from lay witnesses, his opinions
are unreliable.

Defendants submit the Court, acting as gatekeeper, should exclude such

testimony and evidence at trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, portions of J , Phillip Cook's .Appraisal should be stricken and he
should not be permitted to express his opinions at trial based upon irrelevant hearsay and lay
opinion.

pi

*ik

DATED Ms/JO

day of March, 2010
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C.

: J. Winder
.W.Holt
Attorneys for Defendants
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Exhibit "A"

J
SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES IVERS
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT)
Parcel Number 269
Project No. STP-0067(1)0

Located at
± 1 2 5 3 North Highway 89
Farmington, Davis County, Utah

PREPARED FOR:
STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEh
c/o Mr. Randy Hunter

::

l

160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

Submitted by:
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE
Director, and
Richard SJoan, Appraiser
LECG, LLC
201 South Main Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561

EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE:
December 30,2002

LeCG
March 3,2010

Mr. Randy Hunter
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Re:

Appraisal: A partial taking of the view out properly right appurtenant to land owned
by James Ivers, et al. (Arby's Restaurant), located'at ±1253 North Highway 89,
Farmington, Davis County, Utah. Parcel No. 269 of Project No. STP-0067(1)0.

Dear Mr. Hunter:
As you know, on September 4, 2003, we provided an appraisal addressing market value of
the taking of land and site improvements from the above-referenced property. That
appraisal, which addressed the value of the property taken, severance damages and benefits,
was the basis for negotiations that resulted in settling the majority of issues regarding the
property owner's claim for compensation. Specifically, the parties have reached settlement
on the value of the property actually taken and claimed severance damages relating to the
taking of landscaping that left the property non-conforming relative to zoning.
The Court has heard and ruled on the owner's claim that lost visibility/exposure and reduced
accessibility from the highway have reduced the value of the properly. The Court ruled that
properly owners have no appurtenant rights to exposure from fronting traffic and have
appurtenant rights only to adequate access. The Court concluded that the subject's access in
the after condition is reasonable. The Court also heard and ruled on the owner's claim that
lost view out reduced value- of the property, its conclusion was that view, from a. property
abutting a public road is an appurtenant right and, since construction of the government's
project required the subject land and resulted in reduced view, damages related thereto
must be addressed.
This appraisal focuses on the single issue of severance damages, if any, resulting from the
reduced view to the east due to UDOT's elevated reconstruction of U.S. Highway 89. It
considers the subject net of land and site improvements taken, for which compensation has
been paid.
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As a summary appraisal report, this presents only summary discussion of the data, reasoning,
and analyses that are used in the appraisal process to develop an opinion of value. The
depth of discussion contained in this report is specific to the needs of the client and for the
intended use stated within this report.
The report complies with the Utah Relocation Act and the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal -Practice (USPAP) as promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation.
The valuation date is December 30, 2002, which is the date of Service of Summons. After
careful consideration and analysis of available information, we are of the opinion that marketvalue of the subject is not negatively affected by the reduced view out Therefore, no
compensation beyond that already paid for the taking and claimed severance damages for
lost landscaping is concluded.
This conclusion is subject to assumptions and limiting conditions contained in the report.
We trust this is sufficient to accomplish its intended function. Please call if we can be of
further assistance.
Respectfully submitted,

2u4w»jL <L $****<-<
[J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE
LECG, LLC, Director
Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11

201 South Main, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84111
main 801.364.6233 fax 801.364.6230 www.Iecg.com

Richard C. Sloan
LECG, LLC, Appraiser
Utah State.- Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11

LECG

CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION

We certify that we have made an investigation and analysis of the following property:

Property Owned by James Ivers, e t al.
(Arby's Restaurant)
Located at ±1253 North Highway 89
Farmington, Davis County, Utah
Davis County Assessor's Parcel No. 08-051-0097
We certify that to the best of our knowledge and belief:
The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions and are our
personal, impartial,'and unbiased professional analyses, opinions, arid conclusions,

5.
6.
7.

We have no present or prospective interest in the properly that is the subject of this report, and we have no personal interest with
respect to the parties involved.
We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report and no personal interest with respect to
the parties involved.
We have no bias with respect to the properly that is the subject of this reportertothe parties involved with this assignment
Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing.or reporting predetermined results.
Our compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a predetermined value or
direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this appraisal.
The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the
requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics & Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal institute, which
include the Uniform Standards or" Professional Appraisal Practice*

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Weihave made an inspection of the property that is the subject of this report
No one provided professional assistance in preparing this report
J. Philip Cook has completed the requirements of the continuing education program of the Appraisal Institute.
The value conclusion as well as other opinions- expressed herein are not based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific
valuation, or the approval of a loan.
Our state appraisal certifications have not been revoked, suspended, canceled, or restricted.
The undersigned hereby acknowledge that they have the appropriate education and experience to complete the assignment in a
competent manner. The reader is referred to the appraisers' Statement of Qualifications.
J. Philip Cook is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5451057-CG0Q,
Richard C. 5ban is currently a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah #5707759-CG00

Dated: March 3, 2010

U*W<8AJL (L
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|J. Philip Cook, MAI CRE
LECG, LLC, Director

Richard C. Sloan

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5451057-CG00 Expires 06-30-11

Utah State - Certified General Appraiser
Certificate 5707759-CG00 Expires 11-30-11

LECG, LLC, Appraiser
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SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

f\ :f,:ij ket Participant Intei vie\ vs

We interviewed the assistant store manager of Smith's Food and Drug and the owner of
Burger King, which are located on the east side of Highway 89 across from the : ;i: •- Similar to the subject, both Smith's «*:

; : . .-»• } :ng \ave restrictec . !o:w-- .•••:s: d-.- .• *e

Highway 89 overpass, althoi igh b o r .

- .

_

(i'-tor* •'-"• -!v- overpass than the subject.

Smith's assistant store manager, Dan Woodyatt, said that the lack of view out of the store
was not an issue and that he was unaware of any complaints by customers due to the view.
He said that business had increased 20 percent over the past year and 2 5 percent or more
over the past two years.

•-• '
partner,

-

ail i Restai n ai its, wl io <

.-i purchased the store in

.^ store said that 1 ie
•

-

- construction of the

overpass. He said that the view of the overpass from the restaurant had no bearing on the
purchase of the property including the purchase price, iior did the ilewfy .constructed
overpass have any impact in general.

Adan :i ,1 law Ices i i it) :» f i, M Ito.1 i in :i I a) t o i :i

> i 1 io is assist!i ig i.i i i edevelopment of the

nursery/greenhouse area of the Kmart located just west of the subject, said that no one cares
what they are looking at once they get inside the building. Likewise, Nick Mason with CB
Richard Ellis, said that view out is not an issue and what property users want is exposure.
Mason, is currently listing a..pad.site.ior.sale..located.pear-the-680...North/lrl 5 .interchange..in..
Clearfield. The pad site abuts the freeway off-ramp v.':.»; '

- r.r; - . ~r ,-./

r;v ...

»

cross over 680 Noi th„ Mason said that irregi jlai shape < ,i, he l( rarcel aifected the asking | nlct,
but no consideration was given for the obstructed view out to the east by the freeway.

We spoke with the managers of several fast-food restaurants, including the managers of
Cad's Jr., McDonalds, and Arby's in Clearfield, Carl's Jr., Taco Bell and Arby's in Centerville,
and KFC located in Salt Lake City along State Street All oftl iese fast-food restaurants ab it a
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freeway overpass or raised freeway, with the view in at least one direction obstructed by the
freeway. None of the managers interviewed reported any customer complaints regarding a
limited view in one direction and none reported that the obstructed view affected business.
Of particular note is the Clearfield Arby's, which has a similar site layout to the subject as the
restaurant faces east with the raised freeway located across the street to the east The
manager said that the raised freeway had no impact on the business as it was across the
street She also said that customers could see the mountains to the east over the overpass.
The regional manager for Arby' at this store, Matthew Martin, said that traffic and exposurewere the important issues. Martin said that once the customers were inside the store it
didn't really matter what the view was.

The layout of the Arby's location in Clearfield, which was constructed around 1993, is
similar to the layout of the subject. Joe Rich, the property's developer with Woodbury
Corporation, said he does not remember view out being discussed in any way. He said that
Woodbury would not have reduced the price because of the obstructed view.

The property owner of the Clearfield Arby's, Treesa Kurtzeborn, said that the raised freeway
was not a factor in her decision to purchase the building. She said that the freeway was both
a positive and a negative, mentioning the increased exposure and proximity to an off-ramp
as positives. She did not mention what the negatives were but said that the raised freeway
was far enough away that it didn't hurt the property. Kurtzeborn said that in purchasing the
.propeity-sheJooked more. at.what the .surrounding..d.eyelopment was..aad_th.eJype„of.draw
the area would have. In reference to the subject Arby's, she said that the loss of Kmart
would be a larger impact on the subject than the highway project as there is no longer a
major draw to the center.

Wendall Burt of Burt Brothers Tire, who leases the adjoining tire store to the north,
purchased the subject in October 2009. According to Mr. Burt, his store has not been
affected by the reduced view out Although his store was affected during construction, once
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customers figured oi it how to use the interchange upon completion of construction; his
business quickly recovered. This relates to access, visibility and exposure, and specifically
not view out l\ir. Burt said he purchased the adjoining Arby's restaurant with the intent of
expanding his store upon termination of the lease in 2017.
W e also interviewed the sites selection mat lagers for \ fm Ions fast -food chains concerning site
selection criteria and view oul.

RJISS

Smith, the site selection manager for Wendy's, said that

view is a plus, but the view must be really bad before it becomes a negative, such as looking
at a garbage dump. With regards to the subject property, it is his opinion that the view is
neutral. Smith said that the primary concerns are access and exposure, with demographics
also playing a role, and lie woi fid I lave i to.probler n sitii ig a i estaurai it near at i overpass as it
i i iay n lean bett 2i exposi it e. ! le i noted that t h e viev\ out from the Wendy's restaurant in
Centerville is of a gas station to the north and other retail development to t h e west and east
Smith also said that view-out may be an issue for a casual or fancy restaurant where patrons
are sitting for an hour or more

Lisa Shaw, the western region site selection manager with Can I'

:

that \ iew out is i ;tot

an issue as lonjj <e it n. not bad, such as an adult entertainment establishment Shaw said
that the main criteria considered in site selection relates to lot size, demographics, price,
access, and visibility. She said that she tries to site the restaurants by other retailers or
restaurants as she does not consider the store to be a draw by itself. Shaw said that if she
can ..get .people in. the door, j£ really .doesn't matter ,w.h&^

store., ijithe..

case of Arby's, she said it is the loss of visibility from the road that hurts the most. Shaw
referenced a store in I lew Mexico where an overpass was constructed in front of it
Although access was unchanged, it was her opinion that the loss of exposure from the road
hurt the business.

We discussed site selection with Joe Langran, the western region site selection i nanagei for
Arby's restaurants, ai id , vei e pi ovided vv it! i tl le Arby's site selection criteria (previously1

PROPERTY O W N E D BY JAMES IVERS - ARBY'S RESTAURANT/03-201 OSL

PAGE S3

LECG

SUMMARY APPRAISAL REPORT

presented) by Lynn McDaniel with the corporate office. Arby's site selection criteria was
discussed earlier. Langran added that he tries to find sites where there is energy with a mass
of surrounding development, and tries to negotiate reciprocal parking.

With regards to view, Langran said that view is a factor, albeit very minor. He said there are
many locations that do not have great views and that customers aren't there to look at the
view. According to Langran, customers are not interested in what they are looking at outthe
window. He said while a view of the mountains may be nice, it is not critical.

!n addition, Langran said that loss of exposure affects the impulse buyer which is roughly 20
percent of the business. He said that office or residential customers that are either return or
local customers are not affected by exposure as they know where the restaurant is located
and know the back way into the property.

For additional support, photographs of various properties with obstructed views in one or
two directions, some of which were previously discussed, are presented in the addenda.
The majority of th£se properties were built with the view obstruction already in place, and
there is no evidence any of the properties' values were affected by the impaired view out

Conclusion

The* paired data analysis is quite "conclusive that'retail prope'rty'values'We'not irnp"acte"d
negatively by the loss of view out this is also the overriding consensus among real estate
agents, property owners, on-site manager, and site selection managers for national fast-food
restaurants. On this basis, the loss of view out is not considered to reduce the subject's
value.
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PROPERTY OWNED BY JAMES •
(ARBY'S RESTAURANT)
Parcel Number 269
Project No. STP-0067(1)0

Located at
±1253 North Highway 89
Farmrngton, Davis County, Utah

PREPARED FOR:
STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

c/o Mr. Randy Hunter
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857

Submitted by:
J. Philip Cook, MAI, CRE
Director, and
Richard Sloan, Appraiser
LECG, LLC

201 South Main Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

FILE NUMBER: 10-03-01SL
CASE NUMBER: jiver-25561

EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL DATE:
December 30, 2002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Jw

day of March, 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND MOTION TO
STRIKE PORTIONS OF J. PHILLIP COOK'S APPRAISAL REPORT to be emailed and
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randy Hunter
Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874
randyhunter@utah.gov
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ADDENDUM
C
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under the bridge?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay, let' s look at slide 30, showing the distances.

4
5

You've indicated th at the distances, on the average, are a
1

little bit shy of 200 feet?

6

A.

Yeah, 192 is what we measure from the store, itse l f

7 i to the wall.
8

'

It's about 65 feet from the property line to the

wall.

9

Q.

Okay.

Is it reasonable to review —

t o refer to this

10 : as a "partial view impairment"?
11

A.

12

There' s no

13

Q.

14
15

1

A#

Certainly it's only a partial view imp airment.
—

There's not a total view impairment?
-- there's no material view impairment in most

directions, but to the east there is a partial view impairment.

16

Q.

Is view an important amenity for real estate?

17

A.

It can be.

18

Q.

What type of real estate is view impor tant to?

19

A.

Resort hot els overlooking the ocean, a view would be

20

very i mportant.

21

an amenity for whic h buyers will pay a premium.

Hi gh end homes in resort settings, a view is

22

Q.

How about industrial properties?

23

A.

Industrial properties are not bought f or view out

24

Most industrial bui ldings don't have windows.

25

they may have a few windows in the office area, but industrial

They're --

-191

building s are typically designed for either storage where

2

they're stacking inventory along the outside walls, as well

3

as throu ghout the center of the build ing, and so they don't

4

have win dows; or it's manufacturing, where they don't want

5

employees to be looking out the window while they're --- while
they're working, for safety purposes.
Q.

How about the view in, visib ility; is that important

to an in dustrial property?

9

A.

It can be.

10

Q.

Why is that?

11

A.

Well, some industrial businesses are -- they' 11 have

12

a what we call a "showroom warehouse. "

13

construe tion materials companies like tile companies will

14

like to advertise and get people into their showroom.

15

are actually selling wholesale to the contractors, but the

16

homeowner's picking out the goods.

17

to, say, a freeway or something, and have that visibility, that

18

can help their business.

19
20

Q.

So like a lot of home

They

S o if they can be exposed

Is it customary for them to put some —

their name or

some advertising on the outside of th e building?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Does that contribute -- that visibility contribute to

23
24
25

an industrial property?
A.

An industrial user that is worried about -- or is

hopeful to get some recognition from the marketplace, that's

-201

exactly what they want to do.

2

Q.

It provides some name recognition?

3

A.

Right, but there are a lot of industrial users that

4

don't care. This is sort of a unique little group of industrial

5

users where there's some advantage to that disability.

6
7

Q.

So the visibility in is different than the visibility

out; is that what you're saying?

8

A.

Significantly.

9

Q.

Okay, how about fast food restaurants; is view out an

10
11

important amenity to a fast food restaurant?
A..

It is not.

It wasn't listed in the criteria of site

12

selection for fast food operators.

It wasn't something that in

13

my varied discussions with individuals who are involved in that

14

business identified as an issue.

15

specific paired sales suggested is not an amenity that fast

16

food restaurants care about.

I've also studied it with

17

Q.

Where are fast food restaurants typically located?

18

A.

They are typically located along freeway interchanges

19

or in front of shopping centers.

Ideally, both.

20

Q.

Is that for their convenience?

21

A.

Right, it's for convenience, it's for visibility, it's

22
23
24
25

for accessibility.
Q.

I believe you said fast food restaurants are frequently

located at highway/freeway intersections.
A.

They are.

-411

2
3

Q.

Why is this data collection process so important to an

MAI appraiser?
A.

You know, appraisers are paid for their opinions, but

4

their opinions are only as good as the data on which they base

5

their opinion.

6

obligation to provide appraisal work in a non --

We have a standards obligation, an ethical

7

Q.

Want to pull the microphone back towards --

8

A.

-- in a non-misleading way, and to prove our -- prove

9

our opinions.

Not just to pull something out of the air, but

10

to actually prove our opinions.

11

anecdotal evidence clearly suggesting that view out is not

12

something these fast food operators particularly care about,

13

we need to go to the market to confirm that.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

Even though there's a lot of

So you didn't rely on this anecdotal evidence in

forming your opinions?
A.

Well, I certainly considered it, but it wasn't my

sole reliance.
Q.

Okay, so what's the bottom line from your case

studies ?
A.

That I cannot is -- I cannot find in the marketplace

21

where this changed the subject's situation, specifically

22

related to view, disregarding visibility, disregarding

23

accessibility, disregarding construction nuisance, which

24

I can't take into account, according to the Supreme Court,

25

that just this view impairment has no impact on market value.

-42-

1

Q.

That's the conclusion of your data?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Is that supported by your other research?

4

A.

It is.

5

Q.

Does it surprise you that you couldn't find any value

6

for that view out?

7

A.

It doesn't.

8

Q.

Why is that?

9 '

A.

Because of how common it is in this imperfect world

10 ; that --- that view impairment, especially in situations next to
11

the highway, where you're trying to attract highway business,

12

how common that is, and why a business would locate in that

13

situation if it were —

14

So I'm not surprised by the results.

15

Q.

if it were that critical of a factor.

Now, I've asked you to look at a book by Misters

16 1 Bell and Oral Anderson, published by the American -- or the
17

Appraisal Institute, titled "Real Estate Damages."

18

looked at that book?

Have you

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

You're familiar with that book?

21

A.

I am

22

Q.

In fact, I had the first edition, and you gave me the

23

second edition; is that right?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

A newer mod -- newer version of it.

Is this approach

451

A.

I did.

2

Q.

You obtained anecdotal evidence --

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

-- from market participants; and based upon that

5
6

| effort , that research, what was your conclusion ?
A.

I couldn't isolate or prove or identify any value, 1 oss

7

or val ue diminution related to this partial view impairment out

8

to the east, or this fast food restaurant property.

9
10

MR. HUNTER: Thank you.

Your Honor, mi ght I approac h

for a moment?

11

THE COURT: Please.

12

(Discussion at the bench off the recor<i)

13

Q.

BY MR. HUNTER: So just to conclude, it is y our

14

pro fessional opinion that the view out from the Arby 's

15

res taurant has no monetary value?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

Thank you.

18

If you can stay, because we're going to

nee d to review some of these, if that's okay?

19

A.

I guess so.

20

Q.

I don't know how you got that set up.

21

thank you.

Thank you.

22
23

All right,

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. WINDER:

24

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Cook.

25

A.

Good morning, Mr. Winder.

1
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A.

Yes, that' s my testimony.

2

Q.

All right, and -- and it's 20 to 22 feet high?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

How wide is this?

5

A.

I don't know.

6

Q.

It's quite a distance.

7

It's got hofo many lanes o f

traffic in each direction?

8

A.

9

direction.

10

Q.

11

I believe it has two lanes of traffic in each

All right, and how long is this obstruction, from

where to where?

How long does it run?

12

A.

How long is the road, or how long is the —

13

Q.

Elevated.

A.

Probably three--quarters a mile to th e north and a half

14

1

How long is the road as e levated here?

15

mile to the south.

16

even be yond a half mile to the south.

17
18

Q.

Wo, actually it probably continues elevated

Okay, now we --- we agree that view is a component of

value f or at least some properties?

19

A.

Yes .

20

Q.

All right, and an example would be a res -- a single

21

family residence in a mountain resort?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

It could also be an office building where someone may

24

want to look at the Wasatch and pay a little more rent, as

25

opposed to looking at a building right next d oor ; could be in
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t h a t kind of

situation?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

All right, it could be as individuals.

If we wanted

4

to go vacation in San Francisco, we might be willing to pay

5

more to look at the Golden Gate Bridge or the -- or the bay

6

than something else?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

All right.

9

So a buyer, renter or tenant in these

situations may pay more for a view?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Our disagreement, Mr. Cook, in this case, is with the

12

ultimate issue.

13

been lost by the Arby's operation, did they suffer any damage

14

because of it.

That is, does the impairment of view that's

That's our difference.

15

A.

Yes, that's why we're here.

16

Q.

That's why we're here, okay.

Now, let's talk about

17

some of these —

18

I got had two on each, and I have page numbers different than

19

yours.

20

no way I can read that, but if --

and I'm sorry, I —

a copy of the slides that

In purple and at my age, there's -- I'm sorry, there's

21

A.

If you tell me what it is, then I'll --

22

Q.

Thank you very much.

I appreciate that.

So let's --

23

let's review some of these slides, and talk about them.

24

page 28, and I think it's the Einstein's Bagel.

25

teeny, tiny.

We had it there, yeah.

Good.

I'm on

My copies are

I can't read the
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